Prompt Injection Defense for RAG + Tool-Use Agents: A Threat Model and Practical Controls
Learn real prompt-injection failure modes in RAG and tool-use, plus controls: separation of instructions, tool ACLs, sandboxing, and red-teaming.
Brief
Search intent
Informational (security guidance)
Target audience
CTOs, Security/Platform, Architects
Estimated difficulty
High
Funnel stage
Consideration
Meta title
Prompt Injection Defense: RAG + Tool Agents Threat Model
Meta description
Learn real prompt-injection failure modes in RAG and tool-use, plus controls: separation of instructions, tool ACLs, sandboxing, and red-teaming.
URL
/insights/prompt-injection-defense-rag-tool-agents
Internal links
External references
- LLMOps security best-practices writeups
- OWASP agentic-app references (where applicable)
Suggested graphics
- Attack path diagram
- Policy boundary diagram
- Untrusted input dataflow diagram
FAQ
- Can retrieved documents inject instructions into an agent?
- What should tools deny by default?
- How do you test defenses continuously?
CTA
This is a brief/stub page (not a full article yet). If you want these expanded into authoritative articles, we can turn each brief into a publish-ready piece with diagrams + examples.
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